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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
Volume XIV AUTUMN-WINTER 1964 Number 1
REPUDIATION OF A CONTRACT UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
ARTHUR ANDERSON*ARTICLE 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code contains about twen-
ty sections dealing with the repudiation of a contract for the
sale of goods.' These sections will be discussed under the
following topic headings:
1. The Nature of a Repudiation
2. Repudiation by Failing To Respond to a Demand for Adequate As-
surance of Due Performance
3. The Aggrieved Party May for a Commercially Reasonable Time
Await Performance by the Repudiating Party
4. The Aggrieved Party May Resort to Any Remedy for Breach
5. The Aggrieved Party May in Either Case Suspend His Own Per-
formance
6. The Action for Anticipatory Breach
7. The New Measure of Damages for Anticipatory Breach
8. "Cover"
9. "Cancellation"
10. Retraction of the Repudiation
11. Discharge Without Consideration of Any Claim or Right Arising
From a Repudiation.
1. THE NATURE OF A REPUDIATION
Under the common law, a repudiation of a contract is a manifesta-
tion by a promisor that he wilfully is going to commit a material
breach of the contract in the future, or, in other words, that he is
1 The edition referred to herein is the "1962 Official Text with Comments."
* Professor of Law in De Paul University. Ph.B., 1921, J.D., 1923, J.S.D., 1936, Uni-
versity of Chicago.
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not going to render substantial performance. This manifestation usu-
ally is by spoken or written words, but may be by other conduct.2
Section 2-610 and its comment explain the nature of a repudiation
under the Code:
Section 2-610. Anticipatory Repudiation.
When either party repudiates the contract with respect to a perform-
ance not yet due the loss of which will substantially impair the value of
the contract to the other, the aggrieved party may
(a) for a commercially reasonable time await performance by the
repudiating party; or
(b) resort to any remedy for breach (Section 2-703 or Section 2-
711), even though he has notified the repudiating party that he
would await the latter's performance and has urged retraction;
and
(c) in either case suspend his own performance or proceed in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this Article on the seller's right
to identify goods to the contract notwithstanding breach or to
salvage unfinished goods (Section 2-704).
Comment. 1. [AInticipatory repudiation centers upon an overt commu-
nication of intention or an action which renders performance impossible
or demonstrates a clear determination not to continue with perform-
ance....
2. It is not necessary for repudiation that performance be made liter-
ally and utterly impossible. Repudiation can result from action which
reasonably indicates a rejection of the continuing obligation....
Two theoretical differences between a repudiation at common law
and under the Code are to be seen:
a) Only a promisor can repudiate a contract, and therefore it is
impossible for a promisee in a unilateral contract to do so. The Code,
however, speaks of a repudiation by "either party," and, in so doing,
fails to recognize the possibility of a unilateral contract.3
b) The Code does not use the expressions "substantial perform-
ance" or "material breach," but, instead, speaks of a non-performance
"which will substantially impair the value of the contract to the
other." The difference is discussed in Topic 2 in connection with
the phrase "due performance."
2 RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTS § 318 (1932); Anderson, Repudiation of Contract-The
Post-Restatement Cases, 6 DE PAUL L. REV. 1, 3-8 (1956).
3 Anderson, Contracts Law in the Uniform Commercial Code, Illinois Continuing
Legal Education, Jan. 1963, p. 14-16, 18-21.
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2. REPUDIATION BY FAILING TO RESPOND TO A DEMAND FOR
ADEQUATE ASSURANCE OF DUE PERFORMANCE
Section 2-609 creates a new contract enforcement procedure for
the situation where one party feels insecure as to the other's perform-
ance. The section is involved in the present discussion because it
declares that the failure of the suspected party, after a justified de-
mand, to furnish adequate assurance of due performance is a repudia-
tion of the contract.
Section 2-609. Right to Adequate Assurance of Performance.
(1) A contract for sale imposes an obligation on each party that the
other's expectation of receiving due performance will not be impaired.
When reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with respect to the per-
formance of either party the other may in writing demand adequate
assurance of due performance and until he receives such assurance may
if commercially reasonable suspend any performance for which he has
not already received the agreed return.
(2) Between merchants the reasonableness of grounds for insecurity
and the adequacy of any assurance offered shall be determined according
to commercial standards.
(3) Acceptance of any improper delivery or payment does not preju-
dice the aggrieved party's right to demand adequate assurance of future
performance.
(4) After receipt of a justified demand failure to provide within a
reasonable time not exceeding thirty days such assurance of due perform-
ance as is adequate under the circumstances of the particular case is a
repudiation of the contract.
[As an aside, it may be noted that the Code's refusal to recognize the
existence of the unilateral contract is illustrated by the statement in the
first sentence of the section that a contract imposes an obligation "on
each party."]
The section places a new enforcement procedure in the hands of
a party to a contract for the sale of goods, and uses three new ex-
pressions in doing so: "reasonable grounds for insecurity," "due per-
formance," and "adequate assurance of due performance." We have
had no experience with such a procedure and we cannot know what
interpretations will be attached to the new expressions. The present
discussion accordingly will consist mainly of a series of remarks con-
cerning each of the new expressions.
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First, "reasonable grounds for insecurity":
a) Subsection (2) states that between merchants, "the reasonable-
ness of grounds for insecurity . . . shall be determined according to
commercial standards." The comment adds that commercial rather
than legal standards are to be applied, and, to show the difference,
gives the following examples of events which might result in "reason-
able grounds for insecurity" according to commercial standards: a
buyer's failure to make proper payment on separate and legally dis-
tinct contracts; and, in the case of a contract for precision parts
needed immediately upon delivery, the seller's making of defective
deliveries to other buyers with similar needs.
b) "A repudiation is of course sufficient to give reasonable ground
for insecurity. . . ." This statement appears in the comment to section
2-611, and is clearly true. It is believed, however, that in the event
of a repudiation it seldom will be worth while for the aggrieved party
to put the present section into operation by making the written de-
mand for adequate assurance. The repudiator has just indicated in
some manner or other that he will not perform, and it may be ex-
pected that he will ignore the demand that he do perform. He loses
nothing since his failure to comply is merely a second repudiation.
c) The expression "a suspicion of repudiation" describes some of
the comment's examples of events which may result in "reasonable
grounds for insecurity": "a buyer who requires precision parts which
he intends to use immediately upon delivery, may have reasonable
grounds for insecurity if he discovers that his seller is making defec-
tive deliveries of such parts to other buyers with similar needs, ' 4
and "a report from an apparently trustworthy source that the seller
had shipped defective goods or was planning to ship them would
normally give the buyer reasonable grounds for insecurity." 5 These
events are circumstantial evidence that the suspected party will not
perform the present contract; if they give a true picture of the sus-
pected party's intentions, he may be expected to ignore a demand
for adequate assurance of due performance; if they give a false pic-
ture, the suspected party may be expected to receive such a demand
with bitterness and anger.
d) Insolvency of a credit buyer certainly gives the seller "reason-
able grounds for insecurity," although it is not so stated in the Code
4 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE S 2-609, comment 3.
5Ibid.
CONTRACT REPUDIATION UNDER UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 5
or comment. The credit seller, however, seldom will find it worth
while to use section 2-609, for the reasons that: first, by hypothesis
the buyer almost certainly cannot comply; second, another Code
section gives the seller the best remedy of all under the circumstances,
which is to withhold further deliveries except for cash;6 and, third,
the remedies for a repudiation are of little value against an insolvent
buyer.
e) Insolvency of a credit seller certainly gives the buyer "reasonable
grounds for insecurity," although it is not so stated in the Code or
comment. In the usual case, however, payment comes after delivery,
and the buyer does not need the privilege to suspend his own perform-
ance; the other remedies for a repudiation are of little value against
an insolvent seller. In two uncommon situations, however, the section
may be of value to a buyer: first, where payment is to precede deliv-
ery, and, second, where the buyer owes money to the seller for goods
already delivered under the contract. Here the buyer could make his
written demand, and the seller's insolvency would almost certainly
mean that he could not comply. The seller's failure to comply would
constitute a repudiation by him, and the buyer would then have the
privilege of deducting his damages from the price still due, under
section 2-717.1
f) The expression "a suspicion of insolvency" describes some of the
comment's examples of events which may result in "reasonable
grounds for insecurity": a buyer's falling behind "in 'his account'
with the seller, even though the items involved have to do with sep-
arate and legally distinct contracts, impairs the seller's expectation of
due performance,' 8 and "the seller is reasonably entitled to feel in-
secure at a sudden expansion of the buyer's use of a credit term, and
should be entitled either to security or to a satisfactory explanation," 9
also, when the contract provided for thirty days credit with two per
cent discount for payment within ten days, there was "a commercial
foundation for suspicion when the practice [of taking the discount]
is suddenly stopped."'10 Such events as a buyer's falling behind in his
6 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-702(1).
7 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-717 reads as follows: "The buyer on notifying the
seller of his intention to do so may deduct all or any part of the damages resulting from
any breach of the contract from any part of the price still due under the same contract."
8 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-609, comment 3.
9 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE S 2-609, comment 4.
10 Ibid.
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payments on other contracts with the seller, or suddenly increasing
his credit purchases, or ceasing to take a discount for prompt pay-
ment, would, of course, raise a question in the seller's mind. Under
existing law, the seller probably could do nothing unless he were
prepared to allege that the buyer was insolvent, in which case he could
refuse to make further deliveries except for cash." Section 2-609 is
much more favorable to the seller since he need not allege that the
buyer is insolvent, but merely that he, the seller, has "reasonable
grounds for insecurity," and since he not only may suspend his own
performance, but also may acquire the remedies arising from a repu-
diation. While the section is favorable to a credit seller, it is unfavor-
able to a credit buyer. The facts mentioned in the comment's examples
may indicate that the buyer is under financial pressure without being
insolvent, and the receipt of a written demand for adequate assurance
of due performance at such a time will certainly increase the pressure
and may be enough to cause his collapse.
g) One situation where the section may be expected to be used is
when the first party is unscrupulous and makes the demand as a harass-
ing or diversionary tactic. It would seem that the second party must
either comply with the demand or run the risk that his failure to do
so may be held ultimately to be a repudiation of the contract.
h) An assignment which delegates performance is said to give
"reasonable grounds for insecurity," in subsection (5) of section
2-210, entitled, "Delegation of Performance; Assignment of Rights":
"(5) The other party may treat any assignment which delegates per-
formance as creating reasonable grounds for insecurity and may
without prejudice to his rights against the assignor demand assurances
from the assignee (Section 2-609)." By way of illustration, assume a
contract for the sale of goods on credit by S to B:
First, S may assign to X his right to receive the price and also
delegate to X his duty to deliver the goods, whereupon, under
subsection (5), B has "reasonable grounds for insecurity," and
may demand assurances from X; or
Second, B may assign to Y his right to receive the goods and
also delegate to Y his duty to pay the price, whereupon, under
subsection (5), S has "reasonable grounds for insecurity," and
may demand assurances from Y.
11 Leopold v. Rock-Ola Mfg. Corp., 109 F.2d 611 (C.A. 5, 1940); RESTATEMENT, CON-
TRACTS § 287 (1932).
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Second, "due performance":
The expression "due performance" is not used elsewhere in the
Code, and is not defined or explained anywhere in the Code or com-
ment, but it appears three times in the present section. It is believed
that as used in the Code it must be understood to mean one hundred
per cent performance, since that is what is "due." No justification is
found for believing that "due performance" means anything less than
total performance: even though the word "due" also means "appro-
priate" or "proper" or "suitable," the conclusion is the same, since
only total performance is "appropriate" or "proper" or "suitable."
Anything less is a breach of contract.
It is believed that "due performance" specifically does not mean
"substantial performance." The argument is made elsewhere that the
Code excludes the doctrine of substantial performance from the law
of contracts for the sale of goods.' If other sections have excluded
the doctrine of substantial performance from the remainder of the
Code, it would be illogical to say that the ambiguous expression "due
performance" has incorporated the doctrine into the present section.
A summary of the argument that the doctrine of substantial perform-
ance has been excluded from the law of contracts for the sale of
goods is as follows:
i) the doctrine is not mentioned anywhere in the Code or com-
ment;
ii) section 2-601 seems to require exact performance at the stage
where the seller is tendering the goods to the buyer:
Section 2-601. Buyer's Rights on Improper Delivery.
Subject to the provisions of this Article on breach in installment con-
tracts (Section 2-612) and unless otherwise agreed under the sections on
contractual limitations of remedy (Sections 2-718 and 2-719), if the goods
or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract,
the buyer may
(a) reject the whole; or
(b) accept the whole; or
(c) accept any commercial unit or units and reject the rest. [Em-
phasis added.];
iii) section 2-703 gives the seller the privilege of "cancellation" in
the event of certain named defaults by the buyer. The comment ex-
12 Anderson, Contracts Law in the Uniform Commercial Code, Illinois Continuing
Legal Education, April 1963, p. 67-74.
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plains that the section is an "index" of all of the seller's remedies "for
any breach by the buyer." Nowhere does the section or comment
refer to the materiality of the buyer's breach or ask whether his per-
formance was substantial;
iv) section 2-711 gives the buyer the privilege of "cancellation" in
the event of certain named defaults by the seller. Nowhere does the
section or comment refer to the materiality of the seller's breach or
ask whether his performance was substantial;
v) in only three limited situations is the nature or extent of the
default expressly required to be taken into account: (a) in deciding
whether a buyer may revoke an acceptance of an item of goods,13
(b) in deciding whether a repudiation is sufficiently extensive to en-
title the aggrieved party to act upon it,14 and (c) in certain eventuali-
ties in the case of a divisible installment contract.15 In these situations,
the test applied by the Code is not the materiality of the breach or
whether the performance as a whole is substantial, but whether the
default "will substantially impair the value of the contract to the
other." The "substantial impairment of the value of the contract"
formula considers only the extent of the harm to the aggrieved party,
and is different from the doctrine of substantial performance which
considers various factors, as is shown by section 275 of the Restate-
ment of Contracts:
Section 275. Rules for Determining Materiality of a Failure To Perform.
In determining the materiality of a failure fully to perform a promise
the following circumstances are influential:
(a) The extent to which the injured party will obtain the substantial
benefit which he could have reasonably anticipated;
(b) The extent to which the injured party may be adequately com-
pensated in damages for lack of complete performance;
(c) The extent to which the party failing to perform has already
partly performed or made preparations for performance;
(d) The greater or less hardship on the party failing to perform in
terminating the contract;
(e) The wilful, negligent or innocent behavior of the party failing to
perform;
(f) The greater or less uncertainty that the party failing to perform
will perform the remainder of the contract.
13 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-608.
14 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-610.
15 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-612, 2-616.
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Third, "adequate assurance of due performance":
a) Subsection (2) states that "Between merchants ... the adequacy
of any assurance offered shall be determined according to commercial
standards."
b) Comment 4 indicates that in some cases "adequate assurance of
due performance" would be provided by "a mere promise," while
in others it would require "the posting of a guaranty":
(4) What constitutes "adequate" assurance of due performance is sub-
ject to the same test of factual conditions. For example, where the buyer
can make use of a defective delivery, a mere promise by a seller of good
repute that he is giving the matter his attention and that the defect will
not be repeated, is normally sufficient. Under the same circumstances,
however, a similar statement by a known corner-cutter might well be
considered insufficient without the posting of a guaranty or, if so de-
manded by the buyer, a speedy replacement of the delivery involved. By
the same token where a delivery has defects, even though easily curable,
which interfere with easy use by the buyer, no verbal assurance can be
deemed adequate which is not accompanied by replacement, repair,
money-allowance, or other commercially reasonable cure.
c) Another excerpt from comment 4 indicates that adequate assur-
ance may require the giving of "security": "However, the seller is
reasonably entitled to feel insecure at a sudden expansion of the buy-
er's use of a credit term, and should be entitled either to security or
to a satisfactory explanation."
d) Comment 4 discusses a 1920 case where the comment says that
the buyer gave "adequate" assurance by doing the following: "The
buyer sent a good credit report from his banker, expressed willingness
to make payments when due on the 30 day terms and insisted on
further deliveries under the contract."
e) Subsection (2) of section 2-611, entitled, "Retraction of Antici-
patory Repudiation," indicates that a retraction which may be suffi-
cient to nullify a repudiation is not automatically an adequate assur-
ance of due performance: "(2) Retraction may be by any method
which clearly indicates to the aggrieved party that the repudiating
party intends to perform, but must include any assurance justifiably
demanded under the provisions of this Article (Section 2-609)."
f) The comment to the section on retraction indicates that adequate
assurance of due performance may be so complex as to require "a
reasonable time . . . to be worked out": "However, after a timely
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and unambiguous expression of retraction, a reasonable time for the
assurance to be worked out should be allowed by the aggrieved party
before cancellation."
Summarizing the foregoing remarks on section 2-609, and its new
expressions, "reasonable grounds for insecurity," "due performance,"
and "adequate assurance of due performance":
a) A first party who clearly has "reasonable grounds for insecurity,"
on account of the other's repudiation or insolvency, seldom will find
it worth while to put the section into operation; on the other hand,
the section may appear to be useful to a first party who justifiably
or unjustifiably is suspicious of the other's intentions or solvency, or
who, being unscrupulous, wishes to divert the attention of, or to
harass, the other party.
b) "Due performance" is to be taken to mean "one hundred per
cent performance," and, specifically, not "substantial performance."
c) "Adequate assurance of due performance," in some cases, may
be given by something as simple as "a good credit report" together
with an expression of willingness to perform, and, in other cases, may
require a "guaranty" or "security," or something so complex that it
will need "a reasonable time . . to be worked out."
3. THE AGGRIEVED PARTY MAY FOR A COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE
TIME AWAIT PERFORMANCE BY THE REPUDIATING PARTY
The foregoing title declares the first consequence of a repudiation
under section 2-610:
Section 2-610. Anticipatory Repudiation.
When either party repudiates the contract with respect to a perform-
ance not yet due the loss of which will substantially impair the value of
the contract to the other, the aggrieved party may
(a) for a commercially reasonable time await performance by the
repudiating party; or
(b) resort to any remedy to breach ....
These questions arise:
(a) What does the aggrieved party postpone in waiting a commer-
cially reasonable time?
(b) What disadvantage does he suffer if he waits longer than a
commercially reasonable time?
In saying that the aggrieved party may await performance for a
commercially reasonable time, paragraph (a) implies that he may not
wait longer than a commercially reasonable time. The alternative to
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waiting is to resort to a remedy under paragraph (b). The answer
to the first question then is that the aggrieved party may for a com-
mercially reasonable time postpone his resort to a remedy for breach.
The foregoing conclusion that the aggrieved party may postpone
his resort to a remedy for a commercially reasonable time implies that
he may not postpone such resort beyond a commercially reasonable
time. After a commercially reasonable time he may not resort to a
remedy, which means that he has no remedy. The answer to the
second question then is that he loses his remedies if he waits longer
than a commercially reasonable time in resorting to them.
Under modern American law, a repudiation has various conse-
quences, of which one of the most important is that the aggrieved
party may sue the repudiator for breach of contract under the doc-
trine of anticipatory breach.'0 No limitation corresponding to para-
graph (a) exists, but, rather, the aggrieved party may sue immediately
or at any time within the period of the statute of limitations, and, if
the statute runs on his action for anticipatory breach, he still has an
action on the actual breach from the date when performance was
due until the statutory period thereafter.17
English law, however, is to the effect that the aggrieved party has
no action for anticipatory breach unless and until he "accepts" the
repudiation, apparently by filing suit, and that if he does not "accept"
the repudiation, it is nullified.' If paragraph (a) were part of an
English statute, it might be understood to mean that the aggrieved
party is given the privilege of postponing action for anticipatory
breach for a commercially reasonable time without suffering the dis-
advantage of being considered to have "rejected" the repudiation, but
if he waits longer than a commercially reasonable time, it will be
considered that he did not "accept" the repudiation and accordingly
has lost his right of action for anticipatory breach.
Comment 1 contains the only Code explanation of the consequences
of waiting longer than a commercially reasonable time:
1.... Under the present section... the aggrieved party may at any
time resort to his remedies for breach, or he may suspend his own per-
formance while he negotiates with, or awaits performance by, the other
16 Anderson, Repudiation of Contract-The Post-Restatement Cases, 6 DEPAUL L.
REv. 1, 8 (1956).
17 Simpson v. Scott, 189 Va. 392, 53 S.E.2d 21 (1949); RESTATEMENT, CONrACTS S 322
(1932); Anderson, supra note 16, at 25.
18 CHESHIRE & FIFOOT, CONTRACT 382-89 (1946); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1322-23,
1333-34 (rev. ed. 1936).
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party. But if he awaits performance beyond a commercially reasonable
time he cannot recover resulting damages which he should have avoided.
The last quoted sentence is unsatisfactory. It seems to say that await-
ing performance beyond a commercially reasonable time (or failing
to resort to a remedy within a commercially reasonable time) may
itself result in damages. The Code contains several remedies for repu-
diation in addition to the action for anticipatory breach, and it may
be that the quoted sentence refers to one or more of them. To the
extent, if at all, however, that the sentence refers to an action for
anticipatory breach, it is in error, since the date of filing an action for
anticipatory breach, within the period of the statute of limitations,
has no bearing on the matter of damages. 19
The first sentence quoted above from comment 1 says that the
aggrieved party "may at any time resort to his remedies for breach."
The third sentence of comment 4 also says that he is free to proceed
"at any time":
4. After repudiation, the aggrieved party may immediately resort to any
remedy he chooses provided he moves in good faith (see Section 1-203).
Inaction and silence by the aggrieved party may leave the matter open but
it cannot be regarded as misleading the repudiating party. Therefore the
aggrieved party is left free to proceed at any time with his options under
this section, unless he has taken some positive action which in good faith
requires notification to the other party before the remedy is pursued.
Each of these sentences, in saying that the aggrieved party may resort
to his remedies "at any time," conflicts with the apparent meaning
of paragraph (a) that he must act within a "commercially reasonable
time," and with the explanation in comment 1: "But if he awaits
performance beyond a commercially reasonable time he cannot re-
cover resulting damages which he should have avoided."
The solicitude for the repudiator expressed in comments 1 and 4
further hinders the understanding of paragraph (a):
(a) The second sentence of comment 4 says that inaction and si-
lence by the aggrieved party "may leave the matter open but it [sic]
cannot be regarded as misleading the repudiating party."
(b) The first sentence of comment 4 says that the aggrieved party
may immediately resort to any remedy he chooses "provided he
moves in good faith (see Section 1-203)."
19 When interest is allowed as damages for breach of contract, it runs from the date
when performance was due, and not from the date of a repudiation or the date of filing
suit. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS S 337, comment h (1932).
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(c) The third sentence of comment 4 says that the aggrieved party
is left free to proceed at any time with his options under the section,
"unless he has taken some positive action which in good faith requires
notification to the other party before the remedy is pursued."
4. THE AGGRIEVED PARTY MAY RESORT TO ANY REMEDY FOR BREACH
The foregoing title declares the second consequence of a repudia-
tion under section 2-610:
Section 2-610. Anticipatory Repudiation.
When either party repudiates the contract ... the aggrieved party
may...
(b) resort to any remedy for breach (Section 2-703 or Section 2-
711), even though he has notified the repudiating party that he
would await the latter's performance and has urged retraction....
The word "remedy" is defined in section 1-201(34) as follows:
"'Remedy' means any remedial right to which an aggrieved party
is entitled with or without resort to a tribunal."
Paragraph (b), by its parenthetical reference to sections 2-703 and
2-711, specifies all of the remedies available to an aggrieved party if
the other is guilty of some kind of wrongful conduct, including a
repudiation. These two sections are described in their respective com-
ments as "index" sections; section 2-703 is said to gather together "in
one convenient place all of the various remedies open to a seller for
any breach by the buyer," and section 2-711, together with certain
sections not here involved, lists the buyer's remedies. Those remedies
for a repudiation which relate mainly to the law of simple contracts
are the following:
a) Recovery of damages by either seller or buyer; this is the action
for anticipatory breach and will be discussed in Topic 6.
b) "Cover" as a remedy of the buyer only; this will be discussed
in Topic 8.
c) "Cancellation" by either seller or buyer; this will be discussed
in Topic 9.
The latter part of paragraph (b) conforms to modern American
law in saying that the aggrieved party may resort to any remedy for
breach, "even though he has notified the repudiating party that he
would await the latter's performance and has urged retraction .... 20
20 Carvage v. StoweH, 115 Vt. 187, 55 A.2d 188 (1947); RESTATEMENT, CoNTRACTs
S 320 (1932).
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5. THE AGGRIEVED PARTY MAY IN EITHER CASE SUSPEND HIS OWN
PERFORMANCE
Paragraph (c) of section 2-610 gives the aggrieved party a supple-
mentary privilege to suspend his own performance while he awaits
performance under paragraph (a), or resorts to remedies under para-
graph (b):
Section 2-610. Anticipatory Repudiation.
When either party repudiates the contract . . . the aggrieved party
may...
(c) in either case suspend his own performance or proceed in accord-
ance with the provisions of this Article on the seller's right to
identify goods to the contract notwithstanding breach or to sal-
vage unfinished goods (Section 2-704).
This supplementary privilege exists also under the common law,
as a part of the doctrine of the dependency of performances in bi-
lateral contracts, under which the obligation of each party to a bi-
lateral contract is dependent upon his receiving substantial perform-
ance. If one party repudiates, thereby manifesting that he will not
render substantial performance, the aggrieved party may suspend his
own performance, and, if he makes a material change of position, he
is discharged.2
It should be noted that the privilege to suspend performance cannot
exist in the case of a unilateral contract. Assume that X says to Y in
May: "If you will deliver to me your horse Selim in June, I will pay
you one hundred dollars on September 1," and assume that Y delivers
Selim to X on June 1, thereby accepting X's offer and forming a
unilateral contract; if X repudiates in July, it is impossible for Y to
suspend his own performance since he has no performance to render.2
In stating in substance that either party may suspend his own per-
formance, the Code again fails to recognize the possibility of a uni-
lateral contract.
6. THE ACTION FOR ANTICIPATORY BREACH
The first remedy for a repudiation listed in Topic 4, as provided
by section 2-610 (b) and its "index" sections 2-703 and 2-711, is an
action for damages for breach of contract by seller or buyer. The
21Nevins v. Ward, 320 Mass. 70, 67 N.E.2d 673 (1946); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§§ 280, 398 (1932).
22 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 13 (rev. ed. 1936).
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language used in the "index" sections is "damages," "damages for non-
acceptance," and "damages for non-delivery," but it is understood to
mean "damages for breach of contract."
This action for damages for breach of contract, which is based
upon a repudiation rather than an actual breach, and which may be
brought as soon as a repudiation has occurred, is the action for antici-
patory breach. It is a part of the common law throughout the United
States, with only Massachusetts clearly opposed.23 In the single in-
stance where the Code names this action, it is called "an action based
on anticipatory repudiation.
' 24
Section 2-610 (b) conforms to the modern American rule in per-
mitting the aggrieved party to sue for anticipatory breach "even
though he has notified the repudiating party that he would await the
latter's performance and has urged retraction."
Section 2-610 (b) departs from the common law in not restricting
the action for anticipatory breach to cases of bilateral contracts exec-
utory on both sides: at common law the action does not lie in the
case of a unilateral contract or of a bilateral contract fully performed
on one side.2
5
Comment 4 to section 2-610 says that an aggrieved party may
immediately resort to any remedy he chooses "provided he moves in
good faith (see Section 1-203)." Section 1-203 reads as follows:
"Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of
good faith in its performance or enforcement." Comment 4 also says
that good faith on the part of the aggrieved party may require noti-
fication to the repudiator before a remedy is pursued. If these pro-
visions apply to an action for anticipatory breach, they are new to
the law and their purpose is not understood.
7. THE NEW MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR ANTICIPATORY BREACH
The Code makes a radical departure from existing law in changing
the measure of damages in all cases of repudiation by the seller and
in some cases of repudiation by the buyer. This change not only
affects the amount of the aggrieved party's recovery, but also has the
235 id. at § 1314 (rev. ed. 1936).
24 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-723.
25 Mabery v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., 173 Kan. 586, 250 P.2d 824 (1952);
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 318 (Supp. 1948).
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collateral effect of making "cover" by the buyer a matter of practical
necessity if the seller repudiates in a rising market.
Under existing law, the measure of damages for anticipatory
breach is the same as in the case of an actual breach, and, in either
case, if the contract is for the sale of goods, the basic element 26 is the
difference between the contract price and market price at the time
and place for performance.2 7 This formula will compensate an ag-
grieved seller for the fact that on the performance date he has the
goods instead of the price to which he was entitled; likewise, it will
compensate an aggrieved buyer for the fact that on the performance
date he has the purchase money instead of the goods to which he was
entitled.
The change made by the Code is to take the market price at the
time when the buyer "learned of" the repudiation, instead of at the
time for performance, as follows:
a) The new formula is to be used in all cases of repudiation by either
seller or buyer if the action comes to trial before the date for per-
formance:
Section 2-723. Proof of Market Price: Time and Place.
(1) If an action based on anticipatory repudiation comes to trial before
the time for performance with respect to some or all of the goods, any
damages based on market price (Section 2-708 or Section 2-713) shall be
determined according to the price of such goods prevailing at the time
when the aggrieved party learned of the repudiation.
b) The new formula is to be used in all cases of repudiation by a
seller, regardless of when the action comes to trial; the market price
date is said to be "the time when the buyer learned of the breach,"
but "breach" is understood to include repudiation:
Section 2-713. Buyer's Damages for Non-Delivery or Repudiation.
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Article with respect to proof of
market price (Section 2-723), the measure of damages for non-delivery or
repudiation by the seller is the difference between the market price at the
20 Other elements in the view of the common law are discussed in RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS §§ 329-41 (1932); other elements in the view of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE are incidental and consequential damages, covered in sections 2-710 and 2-715.
27 Reliance Cooperage Corp. v. Treat, 195 F.2d 977 (C.A. 8, 1952); Continental Grain
Co. v. Simpson Feed Co., 102 F.Supp. 354 (E.D. Ark. 1951), modified 199 F.2d 284
(C.A. 8, 1952); see In re Marshall's Garage, 63 F.2d 759 (C.A. 2, 1933); 5 CORBIN, CON-
TRACTS § 1053 (1950); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS SS 329, 338 (1932); 5 WILLISTON, CON-
TRACTS S 1397 (rev. ed. 1936).
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time when the buyer learned of the breach and the contract price together
with any incidental and consequential damages provided in this Article
(Section 2-715), but less expenses saved in consequence of the seller's
breach.
c) The formula of the existing law, and not the new formula, is to
be used in the case of a repudiation by a buyer, if the action comes
to trial (as it usually does), after the date for performance:
Section 2-708. Seller's Damages for Non-Acceptance or Repudiation.
(1) Subject to subsection (2) and to the provisions of this Article with
respect to proof of market price (Section 2-723), the measure of damages
for non-acceptance or repudiation by the buyer is the difference between
the market price at the time and place for tender and the unpaid contract
price together with any incidental damages provided in this Article (Sec-
tion 2-710), but less expenses saved in consequence of the buyer's breach.
The difference in the amount of recovery, depending on whether
the seller's action comes to trial before or after the date for perform-
ance, comes from the fact that section 2-708 enacts the formula of
existing law, but also says that it is subject to section 2-723, under
which the new formula is applicable if the action comes to trial before
the date for performance.
A change in the market price of the goods after the contract is
made is probably the most common cause of a repudiation of a con-
tract for the sale of goods. The effects of the new formula may be
illustrated by hypothetical sets of facts, under which, first, a seller
repudiates in a rising market, and, second, a buyer repudiates in a
falling market.
Assume a contract made in February for the sale by S to B of 1000
tons of a commodity at $10 per ton to be delivered in June.
a) Assume that an event occurs on March 1 which makes it likely
that the price will rise, and that S repudiates on March 2; assume also
that the market price remains at $10 during March, is $11 in April,
$12 in May, and $13 during June, and, finally, that B sues S for dam-
ages under the doctrine of anticipatory breach on March 20.
i) Under existing law, B will recover $3000, which is the dif-
ference between the market price in June and the contract price.2
ii) Under either section 2-713 or section 2-723 of the Code,
28 These hypothetical facts and the result conform closely to the facts and result in
Reliance Cooperage Corp. v. Treat, 195 F.2d 977 (C.A. 8, 1952).
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B will recover nothing, since the market price at the time of the
repudiation is the same as the contract price.
b) Assume that an event occurs on March 1 which makes it likely
that the price will fall, and that B repudiates on March 2; assume also
that the market price remains at $10 during March, is $9 in April, $8
in May, and $7 during June, and, finally, that S sues B for damages
under the doctrine of anticipatory breach on March 20.
i) Under existing law, S will recover $3000, which is the dif-
ference between the market price in June and the contract price.
ii) Under the Code, S's recovery will depend on when the
action comes to trial:
If trial occurs after the performance date, as is probable, sec-
tion 2-708 applies the rule of the existing law, and S will recover
$3000, which is the difference between the market price at the
time for "tender" and the contract price.
If trial occurs before the performance date, which will ordi-
narily happen only in the rather unusual case where the contract
has a performance date some years in the future, section 2-723
applies the new formula, and S will recover nothing since the
market price at the time of the repudiation is the same as the con-
tract price.
An aggrieved seller is subject to the Code's new formula only in the
case of a long-term contract where an action for anticipatory breach
may come to trial before the performance date, and he can avoid the
effect of the new formula even in that situation by delaying suit for
anticipatory breach, or by suing only for the actual breach after the
performance date has passed. In either such case, section 2-708, and
not 2-723, is applicable, and the measure of damages is the difference
between the market price at the time for "tender" and the contract
price.
An aggrieved buyer, however, cannot avoid the new formula in any
case when the seller repudiates: whether he sues for anticipatory
breach or only for the actual breach after the performance date has
passed and whether trial occurs after the performance date under sec-
tion 2-713 or before the performance date under section 2-723, his
recovery is the same, namely, the difference between the contract
price and the market price at the time of the repudiation. The new
formula diminishes the value of his action for damages: he recovers
the amount that the market price has increased between the date of the
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contract and the date of the repudiation, and an alert seller can make
that difference small or nothing by repudiating immediately after a
price rise appears to be likely. This deterioration to the point of
worthlessness in the buyer's action for damages practically compels
him to resort to the remedy of "Cover," which is discussed in Topic
8.
8. "COVER"
The previous discussion concluded by pointing out that the Code's
new formula for determining the buyer's damages, in the case of a
repudiation by the seller in a rising market, practically compels the
buyer to resort to the remedy of "cover."
Section 2-711, an "index" section of the remedies of the buyer,
says that a buyer may "cover" if the seller repudiates, and section
2-712 explains what "cover" is:
Section 2-711. Buyer's Remedies in General; Buyer's Security Interest in
Rejected Goods.
(1) Where the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or the buyer
rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance then with respect to
any goods involved, and with respect to the whole if the breach goes to
the whole contract (Section 2-612), the buyer may cancel and whether or
not he has done so may in addition to recovering so much of the price as
has been paid
(a) "cover" and have damages under the next section as to all the
goods affected whether or not they have been identified to the
contract; or
(b) recover damages for non-delivery as provided in this Article
(Section 2-713).
Section 2-712. "Cover"; Buyer's Procurement of Substitute Goods.
(1) After a breach within the preceding section the buyer may "cover"
by making in good faith and without unreasonable delay any reasonable
purchase of or contract to purchase goods in substitution for those due
from the seller.
(2) The buyer may recover from the seller as damages the difference
between the cost of cover and the contract price together with any inci-
dental or consequential damages as hereinafter defined (Section 2-715),
but less expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach.
(3) Failure of the buyer to effect cover within this section does not bar
him from any other remedy.
Although section 2-712 says that the buyer may cover after a
"breach," the meaning is understood to be that he may cover if the
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seller repudiates: a repudiation is one of the facts mentioned in section
2-711 which entitles the buyer to cover.
"Cover" accordingly is a remedy available to a buyer if a seller re-
pudiates, and means that he may buy or contract to buy substitute
goods from a different seller, and, having done so, may recover as
damages the difference between the contract price and the "cost of
cover," which will be what he pays the second seller. Section 2-715
provides that he also may recover any "incidental" or "consequential"
damages sustained:
Section 2-715. Buyer's Incidental and Consequential Damages.
(1) Incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach include . . .
any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in connec-
tion with effecting cover....
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and
needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason
to know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover
or otherwise ...
Section 2-712 states that cover is to be made "without unreasonable
delay," but the comment gives a somewhat contradictory explanation:
The requirement that the buyer must cover "without unreasonable de-
lay" is not intended to limit the time necessary for him to look around
and decide as to how he may best effect cover. The test here is similar to
that generally used in this Article as to reasonable time and seasonable
action.
"Cover" is similar to a procedure in existing law known as making a
"forward contract" or a "forward-loooking contract." The matter has
come up when a buyer of goods has sued a repudiating seller for
damages consisting of the difference between the contract price and
the market price at the time and place for performance, and when the
seller has replied that the buyer could and should have avoided all or
part of his damages by making a "forward contract," at the time of the
repudiation, to buy substitute goods from a different seller. American
courts have refused to agree with the seller's contention, however, and
have said that the buyer was not required, for the sake and benefit of a
repudiating seller, to run the risks involved in making such a forward
contract.29 The buyer accordingly has recovered as damages the dif-
29 Reliance Cooperage Corp. v. Treat, 195 F.2d 977 (C.A. 8, 1952); Continental
Grain Co. v. Simpson Feed Co., 102 F.Supp. 354 (E.D. Ark. 1951), modified 199 F.2d
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ference between the contract price and the market price at the time
and place for performance.
A point to be mentioned in passing, but which is outside the scope
of the present discussion, is that the Code provides that the buyer may
"cover," not only after a repudiation, but also after an actual breach
without repudiation.3 °
Considerable latitude is given to the buyer when he covers, as is in-
dicated in the comment to section 2-712:
(2) The definition of "cover" under subsection (1) envisages a series of
contracts or sales, as well as a single contract or sale; goods not identical
with those involved but commercially usable as reasonable substitutes un-
der the circumstances of the particular case; and contracts on credit or
delivery terms differing from the contract in breach, but again reasonable
under the circumstances. The test of proper cover is whether at the time
and place the buyer acted in good faith and in a reasonable manner, and it
is immaterial that hindsight may later prove that the method of cover used
was not the cheapest or most effective.
Various bits of language in the Code and comment give the impres-
sion at first glance that cover is an entirely optional remedy for a
repudiation by a seller. The fact, however, is that cover is practically
mandatory. If a buyer does not cover when a seller repudiates, these
are the consequences:
a) The buyer will be unable to recover damages based on a rise in
the market price of the goods occurring between the date of the
repudiation and the date for performance, or, in other words, his
recovery will be limited to the rise which has occurred between the
date of the contract and the date of the repudiation. If the seller is alert
and repudiates before much or any of the rise has occurred, the buyer
will be able to recover little or nothing, regardless of how much the
price rises by the date for performance. This consequence is a result
of the Code's new formula, discussed in Topic 7, under which the
284 (C.A. 8, 1952); Joseph Denunzio Fruit Co. v. Crane, 79 F.Supp. 117 (D. Cal. 1948).
"It is never necessary to expend time or money in an effort to avoid injurious conse-
quences unless the advantage to be derived from such expenditure is almost certain.
The plaintiff is not required to run the risk of increasing his loss. For this reason, where
the defendant has committed an anticipatory repudiation, it is not necessary for the
plaintiff to make a speculative forward contract at the time of the repudiation." 5
COBIN, CoNTRACTs § 1042, at 222 (1950). 5 CORtBIN, op. cit. supra §§ 1053, 1101; 5 WIL-
LISTON, ColNIACrs S 1397 (rev. ed. 1936).
30 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-711 (1).
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measure of damages for a repudiation by a seller is the difference be-
tween the contract price and the market price at the time when the
buyer learned of the repudiation.
b) The buyer may be unable to recover consequential damages un-
der section 2-712 (2), since they are defined in section 2-715 (2) as
including "any loss resulting from general or particular requirements
and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to
know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or
otherwise. .... "
c) The buyer may be unable to obtain specific performance, as is
indicated by the following excerpt from the comment to section
2-712: "Moreover, the operation of the section on specific perform-
ance of contracts for 'unique' goods must be considered in this con-
nection for availability of the goods to the particular buyer for his
particular needs is the test for that remedy. .. ."
d) The buyer may be deprived of the remedy of replevin under
section 2-716 (3): "The buyer has a right of replevin for goods
identified to the contract if after reasonable effort he is unable to
effect cover for such goods or the circumstances reasonably indicate
that such effort will be unavailing...."
The various bits of language in the Code and comment, above re-
ferred to, which give the impression at first glance that cover is an
entirely optional remedy for a repudiation by a seller, when in fact it
is practically mandatory, and which therefore are misleading, are the
following:
a) This language from section 2-711 (1): "Where the seller ...
repudiates ... the buyer ... may. . . 'cover' ... "
b) This language from section 2-712 (1): "After a breach [re-
pudiation] within the preceding section the buyer may 'cover .... "
c) Subsection (3) of section 2-712: "Failure of the buyer to effect
cover within this section does not bar him from any other remedy."
d) Comment 3 to section 2-712:
3. Subsection (3) expresses the policy that cover is not a mandatory
remedy for the buyer. The buyer is always free to choose between cover
and damages for non-delivery under the next section.
However, this subsection must be read in conjunction with the section
which limits the recovery of consequential damages to such as could not
have been obviated by cover. Moreover, the operation of the section on
specific performance of contracts for "unique" goods must be considered
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in this connection for availability of the goods to the particular buyer for
his particular needs is the test for that remedy and inability to cover is
made an express condition to the right of the buyer to replevy the goods.
The foregoing comment is helpful in warning that failure to cover
may cause the buyer to lose the right to consequential damages, spe-
cific performance, and replevin, but it is seriously misleading in failing
to warn that his action for damages may be worth little or nothing.
e) Comment 5 to section 2-713: "The present section provides a
remedy which is completely alternative to cover under the preceding
section and applies only when and to the extent that the buyer has not
covered."
The Code is inconsistent in causing a seller's repudiation in a rising
market to give a buyer a different measure of recovery depending on
whether the buyer proceeds by way of an action for damages or by
way of cover. If the buyer chooses to sue for damages, he will recover
the difference between the contract price and the market price at the
time of repudiation. If he chooses to cover, he will recover the differ-
ence between the contract price and the cost of cover, and this differ-
ence will tend to equal the difference between the contract price and
the market price at the time for performance.
The Code's new formula for determining the buyer's damages in
case the seller repudiates, that is, the difference between the contract
price and the market price at the time of the repudiation, causes an
aggrieved buyer's action for damages to be worth little or nothing if a
seller repudiates in a rising market, and, correspondingly, encourages
a seller to repudiate. If something happens after the contract is made
which causes the seller to think that the market price is going to rise
between then and the time for performance, he will be induced to
repudiate and will hope that the buyer will sue for damages, since this
will result in the cheapest outcome for the seller. The seller will be
liable only for the amount that the price has risen between the con-
tract and the repudiation.
On the other hand, if the market price rises to the date for perform-
ance, the most expensive courses for the seller are:
a) To perform on the due date; this is expensive because the market
price of the goods being delivered exceeds the contract price to the
extent of the price rise. He can avoid this outcome by not delivering
at all.
b) To commit an actual breach on the due date by not delivering;
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this is expensive because the buyer can recover as damages the differ-
ence between the contract price and "the market price at the time
when the buyer learned of the breach," which usually will be on the
date for performance. The seller can avoid this outcome by repudiat-
ing before the date for performance, whereupon the buyer's damages,
under the new formula, become the difference between the contract
price and the market price at the time of the repudiation.
c) To be compelled to pay the damages resulting from cover, name-
ly, the difference between the contract price and "the cost of cover";
this will be expensive because this difference will tend to equal the dif-
ference between the contract price and the market price at the time for
performance. A repudiating seller cannot avoid this outcome if the
buyer covers in a proper manner, but even here the seller is given an
undeserved advantage by the language of subsection (1): "the buyer
may 'cover' by making in good faith and without unreasonable delay
any reasonable purchase of or contract to purchase goods in substitution
for those due from the seller." This provision seems to place the bur-
den on the aggrieved buyer to show that he acted "in good faith" and
"without unreasonable delay" and that his purchase was "reasonable."
If the buyer fails to sustain this burden his cover is invalid, and he is
left to resort to his action for damages, under which he will recover
only the difference between the contract price and the market price
at the time of the repudiation.
The deterioration in the value of the buyer's action for damages
caused by the Code's new formula, and the resulting practical neces-
sity that he assume the burden of "cover," may cause him to doubt the
value of a contract as a protection against a market rise.
9. "CANCELLATION"
The third remedy for a repudiation listed in Topic 4, as provided
by section 2-610 (b) and its "index" sections 2-703 and 2-711, is "can-
cellation" by either seller or buyer. The Code definition of "cancella-
tion" incorporates the word "termination," but "termination" is not a
remedy for a repudiation:
Section 2-106. Definitions: "Contract"; "Agreement"; "Contract for Sale";
"Sale"; "Present Sale"; "Conforming" to Contract; "Termination";
"Cancellation."
(3) "Termination" occurs when either party pursuant to a power cre-
ated by agreement or law puts an end to the contract otherwise than for
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its breach. On "termination" all obligations which are still executory on
both sides are discharged but any right based on prior breach or perform-
ance survives.
(4) "Cancellation" occurs when either party puts an end to the con-
tract for breach by the other and its effect is the same as that of "termi-
nation" except that the cancelling party also retains any remedy for
breach of the whole contract or any unperformed balance.
Although the definition says that cancellation occurs when either
party puts an end to the contract for "breach" by the other, the mean-
ing is understood to be that one party can put an end to the contract
if the other repudiates. The reason for this understanding is that each
of the "index" sections 2-703 and 2-711 specifies certain acts of
wrongful conduct by one party, among which is a repudiation, and
each of them then lists various remedies open to the aggrieved party,
one of which is to "cancel."
Cancellation is a new remedy for a repudiation, as is seen when it is
compared with forms of discharge which may result directly from a
repudiation under existing law:
a) A repudiation of a bilateral contract includes a manifestation by
the repudiator that he no longer favors the contract and amounts to a
proposal by him to rescind it. The aggrieved party need not assent,
but he may if he so desires, and, if he does, the result is a rescission by
mutual assent, which discharges both parties.31 Cancellation differs,
since both parties are not discharged, but rather "the cancelling party
also retains any remedy for breach of the whole contract or any un-
performed balance."
b) A repudiation of a bilateral contract entitles the aggrieved party
to make a material change of position, and, if he does so, he alone is
discharged, and he retains his remedies for breach of contract against
the repudiator. 2 It is the material change of position, and not the
repudiation, which discharges the aggrieved party, as is seen from the
fact that the repudiator can retract his repudiation, and thereby nullify
it, until the material change of position, which includes filing suit for
anticipatory breach. Cancellation is similar in that only the aggrieved
party is discharged, but it differs in not requiring a material change of
position. It is assumed that an aggrieved party can effect a cancellation
31 Gibula v. Sause, 173 Md. 87, 194 AtI. 826 (1937); Anderson, supra note 16, at 13.
32 Nevins v. Ward, 320 Mass. 70, 67 N.E.2d 673 (1946); RESTATEMENT, CoNTRAcTs
SS 280, 398 (1932).
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by manifesting that he "puts an end to the contract for breach [or
repudiation] by the other."
10. RETRACTION OF THE REPUDIATION
Section 2-611. Retraction of Anticipatory Repudiation.
(1) Until the repudiating party's next performance is due he can re-
tract his repudiation unless the aggrieved party has since the repudiation
cancelled or materially changed his position or otherwise indicated that he
considers the repudiation final.
(2) Retraction may be by any method which clearly indicates to the
aggrieved party that the repudiating party intends to perform, but must
include any assurance justifiably demanded under the provisions of this
Article (Section 2-609).
(3) Retraction reinstates the repudiating party's rights under the con-
tract with due excuse and allowance to the aggrieved party for any delay
occasioned by the repudiation.
The first thirteen words of subsection (1) conform to the common
law, under which a retraction is the converse of a repudiation, and
amounts to a manifestation by the promisor that he will perform his
promise when the date for performance arrives. 33
The remainder of subsection (1) differs from the common law in its
list of circumstances which bar a retraction. At common law, a repudi-
ation cannot be retracted if the aggrieved party has filed suit for an-
ticipatory breach or if he has materially changed his position,3 4 but the
Code includes two other situations in which a retraction cannot be
made: first, if the aggrieved party has "cancelled," and, second, if he
has "otherwise indicated that he considers the repudiation final." Sub-
section (1) does not mention the filing of suit as a bar to retraction,
but it is believed that filing suit would be a material change of position,
and therefore effective.
The first twenty words of subsection (2) conform to the common
law, but the rest of the subsection refers back to section 2-609, which
permits a party to "demand adequate assurance of due performance"
if he has "reasonable grounds for insecurity." If X repudiates, Y clear-
ly has "reasonable grounds for insecurity," and may make the demand.
The opinion was expressed in the discussion of Topic 2, however, that
it seldom will be worth while for Y to make the demand, since X may
33 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 319 (1932).
34 Ibid.
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be expected to ignore it, in the realization that his failure to furnish the
assurance is only a second repudiation.
If the aggrieved party chooses to put section 2-609 into operation
by making the written demand for adequate assurance of due perform-
ance, then the repudiator cannot retract effectively by the common
law method, but, on the contrary, his retraction now "must include
any assurance justifiably demanded" under section 2-609. The com-
ment to section 2-611 indirectly yields some information as to what is
required by an "adequate assurance of due performance," in that it
indicates that a retraction sufficient to nullify a repudiation is not auto-
matically an "adequate assurance," and also that such an "assurance"
may be of such a complex nature that it will need "a reasonable time
... to be worked out":
2. Under subsection (2) an effective retraction must be accompanied by
any assurances demanded under the section dealing with right to adequate
assurance. A repudiation is of course sufficient to give reasonable ground
for insecurity and to warrant a request for assurance as an essential condi-
tion of the retraction. However, after a timely and unambiguous expres-
sion of retraction, a reasonable time for the assurance to be worked out
should be allowed by the aggrieved party before cancellation.
11. DISCHARGE WITHOUT CONSIDERATION OF ANY CLAIM OR RIGHT
ARISING FROM A REPUDIATION
Section 1-107. Waiver or Renunciation of Claim or Right After Breach.
Any claim or right arising out of an alleged breach can be discharged in
whole or in part without consideration by a written waiver or renuncia-
tion signed and delivered by the aggrieved party.
This section creates a new kind of discharge. It resembles a release in
that it requires a writing and delivery, but it differs in that it does not
require a seal or sufficient consideration.85 Good faith is a requirement,
as is shown by the comment to the section: "Its provisions, however,
must be read in conjunction with the section imposing an obligation
of good faith." The section referred to is 1-203, which reads as fol-
lows: "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation
of good faith in its performance or enforcement."
Observing the Code's definitions from section 1-201: "(36) 'Rights'
includes remedies" and "(34) 'Remedy' means any remedial right to
35 Clark v. Sperry, 125 W.Va. 718, 25 S.E.2d 870 (1943); RESTATEMENT, COTcrAT
5 4o2 (1932).
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which an aggrieved party is entitled with or without resort to a tri-
bunal," and it being understood that, here as elsewhere in the Code,
"breach" includes a repudiation, it appears that any or all of the rights
and remedies of the aggrieved party arising from a repudiation can be
discharged by the operation of the section. The words "waiver" and
"renunciation" are not defined in the Code, and do not have well-de-
fined meanings in the law of contracts. 6
Another section of the Code, as explained in its comment, is de-
signed as a safety measure to prevent a writing from operating as a
''waiver" or "renunciation" when the writer has a different intention:
Section 2-270. Effect of "Cancellation" or "Rescission" on Claims for An-
tecedent Breach.
Unless the contrary intention clearly appears, expressions of "cancella-
tion" or "rescission" of the contract or the like shall not be construed as a
renunciation or discharge of any claim in damages for an antecedent
breach.
Comment. This section is designed to safeguard a person holding a right
of action from any unintentional loss of rights by the ill-advised use of
such terms as "cancellation," "rescission," or the like. Once a party's rights
have accrued they are not to be lightly impaired by concessions made in
business decency and without intention to forego them. Therefore, unless
the cancellation of a contract expressly declares that it is "without reserva-
tion of rights," or the like, it cannot be considered to be a renunciation
under this section.
It should be noted that section 1-107 is in Article 1 of the Code,
entitled "General Provisions," and therefore apparently applies to a
claim or right arising under any Article, but section 2-720 is in Article
2 and accordingly applies only to a contract for the sale of goods.
86 Chapter 13 of the Restatement, entitled "Discharge of Contracts," contains Topic
8, entitled "Discharge by Renunciation or by Executed Gift," which contains seven
sections dealing with extraordinary and rarely mentioned forms of discharge, all effec-
tive without a seal or sufficient consideration. The present section of the Code appears
to be intended to have a very broad application, and not to be related to Topic 8 in
Chapter 13 of the Restatement except in containing the word "renunciation," and in
being effective without a seal or sufficient consideration.
